This Rabbinical opinion was developed by Michael Gillette and it represents a trans-denominational perspective. Readers who identify with a particular Jewish movement or congregation should consider their local Rabbi as the appropriate authority.
Question:
Suppose
that an applicant for a job as a substance abuse counselor has
Facebook postings showing her engaged in illicit drug use?
Would it be lashon harah (slander) if someone who sees the
posting brings it to the attention of the potential employer?
Suppose that an Orthodox Jew is considered a finalist for a
teaching position at a Reform synagogue, but he had previously
posted an article on the internet denigrating the Reform movement?
Would it be rechilut (unethical gossip) if a congregant who
saw the post shared the website with the chairperson of the search
committee? In any case,
is it unethical to share information about an individual that is
posted by the individual in a public way on the internet?
Opinion:
In any
situation in which an individual places information in the public
domain with the clear understanding that it will be viewed by more
than a tightly controlled group of intended recipients,
re-transmission of that information is not lashon harah, although
re-transmission could still be rechilut.
However, if the re-transmission is done with proper intent,
not only might it no longer be rechilut, but it might also be
ethically obligatory to share the information with appropriate
parties.
Before we can examine the halachic
approach to dealing with public internet postings, we must define
our terms. Two concepts
important to this discussion are ‘lashon harah’ and ‘rechilut’.
Lashon Harah, literally translated as ‘evil speech’, should
be understood as any speech act that is damaging or demeaning to
another. Rechilut, or
gossip, should be understood as any speech act that, even if not
damaging or demeaning in itself, will result in increased discord
among people. For
example, if Plony says that Reuven is unintelligent, Plony has
engaged in lashon harah.
If Shimshon tells Reuven that Plony said he was unintelligent, which
is a mere report of true facts that Plony might not even deny, that
is not lashon harah, but it is rechilut.
The accepted
authoritative treatment of these issues is the Sefer Chafetz Chaim
written by Rabbi Yisrael Meir Kagan.
This comprehensive work on the halacha of speech is so
decisive and impressive that its author is most commonly known as
the ‘Chafetz Chaim’, named after his seminal work.
The positions defended in this opinion draw almost
exclusively on a study of the Sefer Chafetz Chaim (here after
referred to as the
In the opening
introduction to the
The starting point
for this discussion must be based on a technical distinction.
The actions described in the question, above, do not fall
under the category of lashon harah for two specific reasons.
First, the
There
are those opinions that hold that if someone related his fellow
Jew’s shame in front of three people, even though this speaker most
certainly sinned in speaking Lashon Hara, even so, if afterwards one
of these three people who heard the remarks repeats them to others,
this person is not said to have transgressed the sin of Lashon Hara,
because once three people already know these comments, word of these
comments are considered to have become generally known to everyone
because of the concept of “word passes from person to person” and
anything that will inevitably become common knowledge was exempted
by the Torah from the laws of Lashon Hara.
The discussion then goes on to argue
that even if three people already know, however, the action of
retransmission could be lashon harah if the speaker is acting with
the intent to broaden the scope of individuals who know the
information.
I believe, however, that the concept of
three people knowing, equivalent to our modern concept of
information in the public domain, demonstrates that retransmission
of the information on the internet is not lashon harah precisely
because the person who posts the information about him/herself on
the internet is intending for the widest possible group of
individuals to see it.
If the retransmitter had hacked into a private space on the internet
and then shared discovered information, it would be plausible to
conclude that the hacker intended to share the information to a
broader audience than that targeted by the initial author.
However, if the information is published on the internet in a
public way, the intent of the initial publisher was for broad
dissemination, and the person who brings that public posting to the
attention of a potential employer has not expanded the scope of
potential recipients.
For this reason, I do not believe that mentioning the existence of a
public web-post to a potential employer is lashon harah.
However, even if this first argument
is unconvincing, a second argument is decisive.
In the scenarios described above, the initial speech acts
under consideration cannot be considered lashon harah because they
are performed by the subject of concern him/herself.
In the two examples cited, the prospective addiction
counselor and religious educator are the very people who engaged in
the initial speech act.
They were talking about themselves, not others, when they posted
their material. In all
discussions of lashon harah, the question involves what person A
says about person B.
Since the initial speech act in our cases is performed by the
potential victim – that is, the person who will be harmed if people
know what he/she said or did – there is no lashon harah.
When a subsequent party retransmits the information that was
initially published on the internet and intended for broad
dissemination, that action could create “discord among people”, but
then the retransmission of the posted material is potentially an act
of rechilut, not lashon harah.
Now that we have
clarified that the actions under consideration are more properly
considered rechilut rather than lashon harah, the issue can be
resolved quite quickly.
The
Kelal Tet section
one of Hilchot Esurei Rechilut (RK9/1) of the
1.
One must not immediately draw a negative
conclusion, but must investigate further.
2.
One must not exaggerate the information.
3.
One must intend only “to achieve a
useful/beneficial outcome”
4.
One must only share the information if there is
no other way to avoid the harmful outcome.
5.
One must not share the information if the harm
done to the subject of the discussion would be inordinate in
comparison to the risk of harm to the person or group being
protected.
On the basis of this material, it
should be clear that if an individual has information that was
published by a potential employee that indicates that the employee
is either incapable of performing appropriate employment tasks, or
that he/she would bring controversy to the hiring agency in such a
way that it might cause the hiring agency to suffer, the person in
possession of the information does not engage in lashon harah or
rechilut by bringing the information to the attention of the hiring
body, provided that he/she does so in a way that is calculated to
avoid harm. Furthermore,
the re-transmitter should share the information only with parties
who can use the information to prevent harm.
In fact, not only is sharing information in this way
permissible, failure to act in a way that is calculated to protect
the hiring agency would constitute a breach of ethical obligation.
The only lingering
question is whether or not this argument can be generalized to all
employment situations. The
Our Rabbis have taught: We support the poor of the heathen along with the poor of Israel, and visit the sick of the heathen along with the sick of Israel, and bury the poor of the heathen along with the dead of Israel, in the interests of peace.
And so we should extend the duties of chesed to all members of our human family.